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: Workers' Compensation Law & the Remedial Waiver

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW & THE REMEDIAL WAIVER
Mary “Kati” Haupt*
INTRODUCTION
State workers’ compensation schemes are long-standing systems that facilitate
efficient markets by identifying the parameters of employer liability for workplace
injuries and granting certainty in recovery for injured employees. Workers’
compensation represents an administrative remedy where no-fault coverage is
provided for employee work-related injuries, the amount of the remedy being
determined by the type and severity of the harm.1 These statutory systems represent
a basic trade-off where, in return for employer strict liability for employee injuries,
employees waive the right to common-law actions against an employer for
negligence.2 Placing the transaction costs in the employment context on “the
employer-injurer, rather than on the employee-victim, is likely to lead to a greater
recognition of accident costs and to greater incentives toward accident avoidance.”3
This article discusses these systems by first looking into the history of workers’
compensation and the reasons for the laws’ implementation. Second, this article
discusses current approaches to applying these statutes, and, using Florida as an
example, explores the harsh remedial results that may follow based on the strict
statutory schemes. Third, this article considers a way to classify this remedy within
theoretical models that facilitate an understanding of how states have developed and
implemented the workers’ compensation systems. Fourth, this article examines the
policy implications of these systems, particularly within such theoretical framework;
it looks to how the exclusivity of this remedy and its narrow exception for intentional
wrongdoing impairs employees’ rights to recovery in particular situations. Finally,
this article concludes that while statutory workers’ compensation schemes provide
the appropriate remedy on paper, the harsh results in the laws’ application
demonstrate that the definition of the intentional tort exception should be revised to
loosen the restrictive remedial waiver.

________________________
*
1.

Mary “Kati” Haupt. J.D., Barry University Dwayne O. Andreas School of Law.
Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Assessing the Insurance Role of Tort Liability After Calabresi, 77 J. L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 135, 144 (2014).
2.
Peter D. Webster & Christine Davis Graves, A Primer on the Intentional-Tort Exception to Employers’
Workers’ Compensation Immunity, 88 No. 10 FLA. BAR. J. 14, 15 (2014); see also Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 1,
at 140 (“The distinctive feature of workers’ compensation is that unlike conventional tort liability, it is a no-fault
compensation system whereby all work injuries are compensated irrespective of worker fault or company
negligence.”).
3.
Guido Calabresi, Torts-The Law of the Mixed Society, 56 TEX. L. REV. 519, 520–21 n.6 (1978).
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I. HISTORY AND APPLICATION OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAWS
Millions of American employees are involved in work-related injuries every
year.4 Under traditional common-law principles, employees possessed ineffective
means to pursue claims against employers that would allow recovery for injuryrelated medical expenses or to facilitate income replacement.5 The lack of adequate
remedies led to the early American workers’ compensation laws.6 These laws were
implemented due to the unavailability of tort remedies resulting from what is coined
the “unholy trinity” of common-law tort defenses: contributory negligence,
assumption of risk, and the fellow servant rule.7 The creation of workers’
compensation systems began in Europe in the late 1870s, and the system’s
implementation in the United States emerged in the beginning of the 1900s.8
Workers’ compensation is administered by each individual state.9 Currently, all
fifty states and the District of Columbia have workers’ compensation statutes in
place.10 The main purpose of these laws is to prescribe a definite remedy for
employee injuries resulting during the course and scope of employment.11 Workers’
compensation systems embody an arrangement between the parties that seemingly
facilitates each party’s conflicting interests.12 An employer is held strictly liable for
its employees’ work-related injuries, and employees in turn surrender separate or
distinct causes of action against the employer: “receipt of certain and expeditious
payments becomes the sole and exclusive remedy for the injury.”13
Present-day workers’ compensation statutes require that employers choose to
directly pay for employee accidents, to contract with private insurance companies to
maintain such coverage, or to pay premiums to an applicable state’s workers’
compensation fund.14 These statutes typically provide that compensation be
measured by an average weekly wage and the type and length of time of the
________________________
4.
See GUIDE TO HR POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MANUALS § 5:4 (2015) (commentary: history of workers’
compensation laws).
5.
Id.
6.
Id.
7.
Joseph H. King, Jr., The Exclusiveness of an Employee’s Workers’ Compensation Remedy Against His
Employer, 55 TENN. L. REV. 405, 409 n.15 (1988); see also Gregory P. Guyton, A Brief History of Workers’
Compensation, 19 IOWA ORTHOPAEDIC J. 106, 106 (1999) (discussing that under contributory negligence principles,
an employee’s recovery was barred by any negligence on his/her own part, the fellow servant rule barred recovery
if the negligence was at all contributable in portion or entirety to a fellow employee, and assumption of risk principles
held that employees knew the risk of employment and accepted it by signing his/her employment contract).
8.
Mark R. Whitmore, Note, Denying Scholarship Athletes Workers’ Compensation: Do Courts Punt Away
a Statutory Right?, 76 IOWA L. REV. 763, 767 (1991) (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON
TORTS § 80, at 573 (5th ed. 1984)).
9.
See Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 1.
10.
Whitmore, supra note 8, at 767.
11.
See id. at 768–70 (explaining that “[p]rior to the advent of workers’ compensation, eighty percent of all
industrial accident claims failed or left the plaintiff uncompensated [and that this] occurred primarily because of
plaintiffs’ difficulties in overcoming their employers’ formidable tort defenses: contributory negligence, assumption
of risk, and the fellow servant doctrine”).
12.
STEPHEN P. PEPE & SCOTT H. DUNHAM, AVOIDING AND DEFENDING WRONGFUL DISCHARGE CLAIMS §
21:5 (2016).
13.
Id.
14.
Whitmore, supra note 8, at 779–80.
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injuries.15 Benefit levels are associated with different types of work-related injuries
based on predetermined payment schedules, and these systems address the income
loss associated with the injury but do not account for pain and suffering or legal
expenses.16
Workers’ compensation schemes provide an exclusive remedy for work-related
injuries,17 with limited exceptions, including an exception if the employer neglects
to carry workers’ compensation insurance or if the employer commits an intentional
tort that results in an employee’s injury or death.18 Under this exclusive remedy
provision, employers waive common-law tort defenses; however, the regime also
provides that an employee may not sue the employer in tort (i.e., for the employer’s
negligence), and the employee’s exclusive remedy is to accept the statutory
compensation for any resultant injury.19 Thus, the compensation is a “‘mechanism
for providing cash-wage benefits and medical care to victims of work-connected
injuries, and for placing the cost of these injuries ultimately on the consumer through
the medium of insurance whose premiums are passed on in the cost of the
product.’”20
Today, although each state’s laws are distinct, all of the schemes possess the
same attributes: the laws create a mandatory statutory program that provides
employees protection for work-related injuries without regard to the fault of the
parties.21 The structure of a state’s workers’ compensation scheme usually is as
follows:
The typical state act include[s] the following features: (1)
negligence and fault of the employer and employee [are] immaterial
to recover, (2) common law suits against the employer [are] barred,
(3) medical expenses [are] capped at a percentage of the employee’s
wage, (4) an administrative agency r[uns] the system with relaxed
________________________
15.
Samuel Estreicher, Judicial Nullification: Guido Calabresi’s Uncommon Common Law for a Statutory
Age, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126, 1133–34 (1982).
16.
Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 1, at 140.
17.
See King, supra note 7, at 416 (“The exclusive remedy rule determines under what circumstances an
employee’s remedy against his employer, his co-employees, and the workers’ compensation insurer is limited to
workers’ compensation, and when that employee may proceed against such entities or individuals under other
theories of liability such as common-law tort.”).
18.
Joseph A. Page, Selecting the Remedy, 3 AM. JUR. TRIALS § 1, at 637 (2016) (originally published in
1964).
19.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.015 (West 2015) (“The workers’ compensation system in Florida is
based on a mutual renunciation of common-law rights and defenses by employers and employees alike.”); see also
Whitmore, supra note 8, at 771–72 (discussing further that these provisions apply to employees and not to
independent contractors, and that the injury must arise from fulfilling the terms of an employment agreement);
Estreicher, supra note 15, at 1134 (“The statutes reflected a compromise: the employee was assured a fairly certain
recovery, but had to forfeit any civil action and the chance, however unlikely, of obtaining more from a jury.”).
20.
Martha S. Davis, Rape in the Workplace, 41 S.D. L. REV. 411, 414 (1996) (citing ARTHUR LARSON,
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT § 1.00, at 1 (Matthew Bender & Co., 2nd ed.
1992)).
21.
See GUIDE TO HR POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MANUALS § 5:4, supra note 4 (“Under these laws, injured
or ill employees are only required to show that their condition arose out of and in the course of their employment.”);
see also Harper v. AutoAlliance Int’l, Inc., 392 F.3d 195, 207 n.4 (6th Cir. 2004) (describing the “ordinary
shorthand” meaning of the workers’ compensation laws as: “a statutorily created insurance system that allows
employees to receive fixed benefits, without regard to fault, for work-related injuries”).
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rules of procedure to facilitate prompt compensation, and (5) state
court review of agency decisions occur[s] on a deferential basis.22
The workers’ compensation system is highly beneficial because it guarantees
employees the right to recover for workplace injuries, grants certainty to employers
about the extent of their liability, and provides efficiency for the process.23 Indeed,
“one might expect that making the employment relationship less confrontational
would also help to preserve the employment relationship, thus facilitating the return
to work of employees who have suffered an injury.”24 However, one area of concern
is that the remedy is exclusive, and although there is an exception in most states for
intentional torts, this exception has become seemingly impossible to prove.25
II. CURRENT STATUTORY SCHEMES
Many states provide for the intentional tort exception via the state’s workers’
compensation statute.26 Yet, the word “intentional” does not carry the same
connotations in the workers’ compensation context as it does at common law.27
“Intentional” at common law means not only purposeful acts, but “also situations in
which the actor knows with substantial certainty that harm will occur.”28 However,
the interpretation by the majority of states is that intent within the workers’
compensation arena only covers an employer’s “purposeful intent to cause the harm
that actually occurred.”29
________________________
22.
See Harper, 392 F.3d at 207 n.4 (citing Arthur v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 58 F.3d 121, 125 (4th
Cir. 1995)).
23.
See John T. Burnett, The Enigma of Workers’ Compensation Immunity: A Call to the Legislature for a
Statutorily Defined Intentional Tort Exception, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 491, 517 (2001) (“In Florida, workers’
compensation law plays an important social role due to the fact that it ‘assures the quick and efficient delivery of
disability and medical benefits to an injured worker and facilitate[s] the worker’s return to gainful employment at a
reasonable cost to the employer.’ For the provision of workers’ compensation benefits to be effective, employers
and employees alike must renounce some of their common law rights and defenses under the law and look to
workers’ compensation as the exclusive remedy for qualifying workplace injuries.”) (internal citations omitted).
24.
Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 1, at 140.
25.
See Michelle Gorton, Comment, Intentional Disregard: Remedies for the Toxic Workplace, 30 ENVTL.
L. 811, 811–12 (2000) (arguing that the “workers’ compensation system’s requirement of an employer’s ‘deliberate
intent’ to injure a worker has been twisted by courts and legislatures so that workers can almost never access the
civil legal system when they have been hurt at work, even if their employer has acted egregiously. With low risks
of civil suits or criminal charges and only a small chance of inspection or serious penalty by regulatory agencies,
the temptation and market pressure is there for employers to choose to save money rather than provide a safe
workplace.”). But see Richard A. Epstein, The Historical Origins and Economic Structure of Workers’
Compensation Law, 16 GA. L. REV. 775, 809 (1982) (“threat to the viability of workers’ compensation . . . concerns
the various judicial efforts to dismantle the exclusive remedy protection that the system affords the employer”);
King, supra note 7, at 416 (“An effective and predictable exclusive remedy rule that limits employers’ tort liability
to their employees is a cornerstone of a viable workers’ compensation system.”).
26.
See 1 JON GELMAN, MODERN WORKERS COMPENSATION § 102:13 (2016) (citing Alaska, California,
Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska,
New Hampshire, Nevada, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, and West
Virginia as examples).
27.
Gorton, supra note 25, at 820.
28.
Id. (citing KEETON ET AL., supra note 8, at 572 n.43).
29.
Id. (citing Davis v. U.S. Emp’rs Council, Inc., 934 P.2d 1142, 1150 (Or. Ct. App. 1997) (stating that the
plaintiff “must prove that his employer withheld safety measures because it wished to injure him”)).
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When an employee is harmed by the intentional conduct of his or her employer,
an election of remedies must be made.30 If the employee chooses to seek redress for
the intentional wrong of the employer through the workers’ compensation scheme,
he or she waives the right to sue in tort.31 Nonetheless, some states still find that the
exclusive remedy provision does not bar an employee’s claim against the employer
for defamation32 or false imprisonment.33 However, in most circumstances, courts
have found that the employee has failed to prove that the cause of action falls within
the intentional tort exception.34
A.

Florida

Adoption of the intentional tort exception to the workers’ compensation scheme
has arisen both through the legislative process as well as through court opinions.35
In Florida, for example, the state supreme court initially created the exception for
employers’ intentional wrongs.36 In Turner v. PCR, Inc., the court stated that
notwithstanding employers’ general immunity from tort claims under the workers’
compensation scheme, Florida case law previously had recognized an intentional tort
exception.37 Thus, the court held that it was reaffirming this holding, and “as have
our district courts and many jurisdictions around the country, that workers’
compensation law does not protect an employer from liability for an intentional tort
against an employee.”38
The court further defined what the intentional tort exception included and
identified two independent grounds where an intentional tort cause of action may
exist.39 First, an employee may bring an intentional tort suit when “an employer
deliberately intended to injure an employee.”40 Second, a cause of action may exist
________________________
30.
See GELMAN, supra note 26 (noting that “in order to maintain the two separate causes of action, the
employer’s intentional act must be separable from the compensation claim and produce an independent injury”); see
also 9 PATRICK JOHN MCGINLEY, 9 WEST’S FLORIDA PRACTICE SERIES § 6A:9 (2015 ed. 2015) (“A worker who
sues his employer at common law has elected his remedy under Fla. Stat. § 440.11(1)”). Id. (Indeed: “[W]hen
summary judgment is entered against [the employee] in the common law action, he may not then pursue a workers’
compensation claim against the employer who has failed to secure compensation benefits. The election of remedies
matures, ‘when the rights of the parties have been materially affected to the advantage of one or the disadvantage of
the other . . . .’ The summary judgment rendered in the circuit court was obviously efficacious. Therefore, the election
matured when the judgment was entered.”).
31.
GELMAN, supra note 26.
32.
See id. (listing cases from Georgia, Indiana, New York, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Utah, and Virginia
all holding that the applicable state’s workers’ compensation scheme did not bar claims for defamation).
33.
See id. (noting that California and Massachusetts courts have held that the workers’ compensation
exclusive remedy provision does not bar claims for false imprisonment).
34.
See Webster & Graves, supra note 2.
35.
See, e.g., Beauchamp v. Dow Chem. Co., 398 N.W.2d 882, 889 (Mich. 1986) (“Because the Legislature
intended to limit and diffuse liability for accidental injury by no means suggests the Legislature intended to limit
and diffuse liability for intentional torts. Accidents are an inevitable part of industrial production, intentional torts
by employers are not.”).
36.
See Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So. 2d 683, 684–85 (Fla. 2000).
37.
Id. at 686 (citing Eller v. Shova, 630 So. 2d 537, 539 (Fla. 1993)).
38.
Id. at 687 (citing Cunningham v. Anchor Hocking Corp., 558 So. 2d 93, 97 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990);
Clark v. Gumby’s Pizza Sys., Inc., 674 So. 2d 902, 904 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); see also 2 Arthur Larson & Lex
K. Larson, Larson’s Workers’ Compensation §§ 68.11–68.15 (Desk. Ed. 1999)).
39.
Id. at 688–89.
40.
Id. at 688.
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when “the employer’s conduct was ‘substantially certain’ to result in injury or death
to the employee.”41 The court explicitly recognized that other jurisdictions had
rejected the “substantial certainty” test and replaced it with a “virtual certainty”
test.42 Yet, the court declined to adopt the more rigid standard.43
After the court’s holding in Turner, the Florida Legislature enacted an
amendment to section 440.11(1) of the Florida Statutes, which created the statutory
intentional-tort exception to workers’ compensation immunity.44 The Florida
workers’ compensation statute provides, in the portion relevant to coverage, that:
The employer must pay compensation or furnish benefits required
by this chapter if the employee suffers an accidental compensable
injury or death arising out of work performed in the course and the
scope of employment. The injury, its occupational cause, and any
resulting manifestations or disability must be established to a
reasonable degree of medical certainty, based on objective relevant
medical findings, and the accidental compensable injury must be the
major contributing cause of any resulting injuries.45
The Florida Legislature has further provided for the applicable “exclusive remedy”
of workers’ compensation:
The liability of an employer prescribed in § 440.10 shall be
exclusive and in place of all other liability, including vicarious
liability, of such employer to any third-party tortfeasor and to the
employee, the legal representative thereof, husband or wife, parents,
dependents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to recover
damages from such employer at law or in admiralty on account of
such injury or death . . . .46
In 2003, the Florida Legislature added the statutory provision that included an
intentional tort exception that differed significantly from the state supreme court’s
holding in Turner.47 The intentional tort exception retains the first avenue crafted by
the state supreme court and allows for employee recovery if the “employer
deliberately intended to injure the employee.”48 However, the second prong of the
test, the “substantial certainty” test adopted by the court, was changed significantly,
and the statute now provides relief only if the employer’s conduct was knowingly
________________________
41.
Turner, 754 So. 2d at 688–89 (explaining that this is an objective standard: “it is apparent that adoption
of a subjective analysis would result in the virtual elimination of the alternative test for liability . . . we conclude that
adoption of an objective standard is more in accord with the policy of the alternative test”).
42.
Id. at n.4.
43.
Id.
44.
See FLA. STAT. § 440.11(1)(b)(1) (2015).
45.
Id. § 440.09(1).
46.
Id. § 440.11(1).
47.
Id. § 440.11(1)(b)(1)–(2).
48.
Id. § 440.11(1)(b)(1).
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“virtually certain to result in injury or death”; the employee was not aware of the
risk; and the employer either “deliberately concealed or misrepresented the
danger.”49 If the employee claims an intentional tort exception, the employee must
prove these elements by clear and convincing evidence.50
Thus, the Florida Legislature “fundamentally changed the nature of that
immunity from the court-created immunity” in several significant ways.51 Not only
did the legislature heighten the evidentiary burden to clear and convincing evidence,
the statutory standard is also subjective rather than objective, and the legislature
rejected the “substantial certainty” test and replaced it with the “virtual certainty”
test.52 Thus, employees waive any negligence—and most intentional tort—claims
they may have against their employer the moment they begin employment.
B.

Harsh Results

An example of the harsh application of the current Florida statutory scheme is
R.L. Haines Construction, LLC v. Santamaria.53 An employee was killed while
working on a construction site when a two-thousand pound steel column struck
him.54 The employee worked on installation of these columns, which he could not
install until an epoxy adhesive cured for seventy-two hours.55 Despite the curing
instructions, R.L Haines instructed the decedent and other employees to install
columns after the adhesive had only been drying for forty-four hours.56 The
employees installed four columns, and while the decedent was tightening a wire on
one of the columns, it fell and killed him.57
The decedent’s spouse filed a wrongful death action against the general
contractor, R.L. Haines, and other defendants.58 R.L. Haines asserted an immunity
defense per the workers’ compensation statute, but the trial court held that the
company’s conduct fell within the intentional tort exception.59 The majority of a
Fifth District Court of Appeal panel reversed, holding that the contractor’s conduct
did not meet the “virtual certainty” standard.60 The court noted that “‘the test is not
whether the injury was preventable,’”61 but instead it is whether “it was virtually
certain that the decedent would be injured or killed as a result of the resumption of
________________________
49.
Id. § 440.11(1)(b)(2).
50.
FLA. STAT. § 440.11(1)(b).
51.
See Webster & Graves, supra note 2.
52.
Id.
53.
R.L. Haines Constr., LLC v. Santamaria, 161 So. 3d 528, 532 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) review denied,
171 So. 3d 120 (Fla. 2015) (noting that the “virtually certain” standard is “extremely difficult to overcome”); see
also Webster & Graves, supra note 2 (“As several courts have noted, the effect of the amendment has been to create
a significantly higher hurdle that employees seeking to overcome workers’ compensation immunity must
surmount.”).
54.
R.L. Haines Constr., 161 So. 3d at 529.
55.
Id. at 529–30.
56.
Id. at 530.
57.
Id.
58.
Id. at 529.
59.
Id. The jury awarded the decedent’s spouse a total of 2.4 million dollars. Id. at 530.
60.
R.L. Haines Constr., 161 So. 3d at 534.
61.
Id. at 533 (citing Vallejos v. Lan Cargo, S.A., 116 So. 3d 545, 554 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)).
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work before the epoxy had fully cured.”62 The court also stated that “[i]t would erode
the statutory standard for overcoming workers’ compensation immunity to indulge
an inference of virtual certainty from the fact that the employee was injured or
killed.”63 Thus, the panel reversed the jury verdict in favor of the decedent’s spouse,
holding that “absent clear and convincing evidence that the decedent’s death was
virtually certain to occur as a result of [R.L. Haines’s] conduct, the verdicts [could
not] stand.”64
One judge dissented from the R.L. Haines opinion, noting that while the statutory
requirement of “virtual certainty” sets the burden high, it “does not mean that it is,
or should be, illusory or unattainable.”65 The dissent relied on additional facts that
were absent from the majority opinion, including that the project manager knew a
bolt had moved, which would not have happened if the epoxy was properly mixed
and allowed to cure for the appropriate amount of time.66 Moreover, the project
manager did not inform the project engineer, and knowledge that a bolt had moved
would have been a “red flag” of installation failure.67 Further, a project manager
testified that under these conditions, the likelihood of employee injury was “more
than certain.”68 Accordingly, the dissent found that “sufficient evidence supported
the conclusion that the employer received ‘explicit warnings specifically identifying
a known danger.’”69 Therefore, the dissent would have held that the decision to
submit the issue of “virtual certainty” to the jury was within the province of the trial
judge, and the jury’s finding that the contractor’s conduct was virtually certain to
result in injury or death should have been upheld.70
R.L. Haines demonstrates that Florida courts applying the 2003 amendment
believe that the intentional tort exception is an extremely high standard.71 No opinion
written subsequent to the statutory amendment concludes that an employee is entitled
to recover under the “virtual certainty” test, and most frequently, the appellate court
is affirming summary judgment in favor of the employer.72
III. CLASSIFYING THE REMEDY
To understand the structure of the workers’ compensation scheme, one way to
discern how legislatures and courts alike have fashioned these workers’
compensation statutes as exclusive remedies lies in the transaction costs associated
________________________
62.
Id.
63.
Id. at 533–34.
64.
Id. at 534.
65.
Id. (Cohen, J., dissenting).
66.
R.L. Haines Constr., 161 So. 3d at 535 (Cohen, J., dissenting).
67.
Id.
68.
Id.
69.
Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 440.11(1)(b)(2) (2010)).
70.
Id. at 535–36 (“In my view, sufficient evidence supported the conclusion that the employer received
‘explicit warnings specifically identifying a known danger.’”).
71.
Webster & Graves, supra note 2.
72.
Id. (referencing List Indus., Inc. v. Dalien, 107 So. 3d 470, 471, 474 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013), review
denied, 122 So. 3d 867 (Fla. 2013); Gorham v. Zachry Indus., Inc., 105 So. 3d 629, 634 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013);
Boston v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc., 112 So. 3d 654, 657–58, 660 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013); Vallejos v. Lan Cargo,
S.A., 116 So. 3d 545, 554–56 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013); R.L. Haines Constr., 161 So. 3d at 530, 533–34).
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with work-related injuries. First, there are the costs related to the rights of the
employees to be compensated for such injuries and related expenses.73 Second, there
are the costs associated with the rights of the employer to have predictable and
efficient outcomes when an employee is injured in its workplace.74 The balance of
these transaction costs can be illustrated through the theoretical model provided by
Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed.75 An additional way to view the
boundaries of the remedies under workers’ compensation law is a model provided
by Daryl Levinson, and assessing how the rights and remedies are interrelated.76
A. Property v. Liability Rule Protections
Under Calabresi and Melamed’s approach, there are two leading types of
protections for entitlements or individual rights: property rules and liability rules.77
Property rules apply to individual entitlements that cannot be taken away from the
owner without the owner’s consent.78 This rule “gives rise to the least amount of
state intervention: once the original entitlement is decided upon, the state does not
try to decide its value.”79 The property rules apply when transaction costs are low
because with low transaction costs, negotiation is available.80 Liability rules, on the
other hand, generally govern when transaction costs are high.81 When transaction

________________________
73.
See, e.g., Estreicher, supra note 15, at 1134.
74.
Sidney A. Shapiro, The Necessity of OSHA, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 22, 23, 28 (1999) (“An employer
determines the extent of its efforts to prevent occupational injuries and illnesses by comparing the cost of prevention
with the cost of not reducing these risks.”).
75.
See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972); see also Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution
and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 500–01, 517 (1961).
76.
See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 857
(1999).
77.
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 75, at 1092.
78.
Id.; see also Michael I. Krauss, Property Rules vs. Liability Rules, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW &
ECONOMICS
782,
786–87
(Boudewijn
Bouckaert
&
Gerrit
De
Geest
eds.,
2000),
http://encyclo.findlaw.com/3800book.pdf (explaining that “[e]ntitlement holders who believe their rights are
protected by a property rule typically insist that they are the victims, not the cause, of damage: otherwise, their rights
would be trumped by utility- or wealth-maximizing constraints, which is contrary to the very notion of property-rule
protection”).
79.
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 75, at 1092.
80.
See id.; see also Keith N. Hylton, A Missing Markets Theory of Tort Law, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 977, 980
(1996) (“Transaction costs include the cost of defining the entitlement, determining its value, and bargaining over
its transfer. These costs are likely to be low in areas where the scope of the holder’s claim is easily delineated, such
as the boundary to a piece of land. The power to enjoin a taking forces the nonholder to meet the asking price in
order to transfer the good from the holder. In the absence of such protection the nonholder would be able to
expropriate part of the value of the holder’s entitlement.”).
81.
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 75, at 1119; see also id. at 1093 (discussing liability versus property
protections, and reasoning that it is relevant to look at if there is an inclination “slightly to prefer one over another
and the first is considerably more expensive to enforce than the second”). Moreover, Calabresi & Melamed discuss
the fact that administrative efficiency is relevant to choosing whether an entitlement is subject to property or liability
rules based on all of the pertinent considerations. See id.; see also Krauss, supra note 78, at 786 (“To the extent
entitlements are protected by liability rules, rights (and therefore causation) are inherently contingent; the cause of
an injury is the efficient avoider of the injury. The cheaper-cost avoider of a loss will always be said to have caused
the loss if entitlements are protected by liability rules.”).
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costs are high for both parties, a liability rule provides the more appropriate remedy
as negotiation will not lead to a Pareto optimal outcome.82
One factor pertinent in the transaction-cost analysis is the need to “minimize the
administrative costs of enforcement.”83 Yet, administrative efficiency is simply one
factor to consider in the overall economic analysis to determine the efficiency of
transactions.84 Calabresi subsequently explained the practicality of the liability rule
approach:
If ideologically mixed, liability rules are also intensely practical.
They enable actions to take place when contractual behavior, before
harm, would not be feasible. Damages after harm replace such
unfeasible agreements. And they permit control of behavior that
could only at too great an expense be governed collectively. By
varying the size of the applicable damages according to the various
circumstances involved, the collective decision makers can go a
long way toward enforcing their views without engaging in minutiae
of control that would not be worthwhile.85
Thus, “the liability rule is an essential part of the social structure and of the law. And
that is so in any number of areas of law, including, of course, torts.”86
To illustrate applicability of the doctrine to the workers’ compensation context,87
assume that an employee has an entitlement to a cause of action in tort for negligence
against an employer. Under the applicable state’s workers’ compensation provision,
an employee waives this cause of action via statute by beginning employment and
has an exclusive remedy for any harm suffered from the negligence of his
employer—workers’ compensation. Therefore, because an employee’s cause of
action dissipates before the employee ever incurs the right—indeed, at the moment
the employment contract is signed—the employee’s entitlement has converted into
an entitlement protected by a liability rule (i.e., to receive the amount of monetary
damages provided for in the state’s workers’ compensation scheme, regardless of the
employee’s wish to sue in tort).
Market inhibition and the efficiency of transactions in the employment context
dictate this outcome, based on the history and the framework of the employeremployee relationship. The reason this is important is that the analysis determines
that an employee does not have a property right in maintaining causes of action
________________________
82.
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 75, at 1119. Calabresi & Melamed discuss Pareto optimality in terms
of economic efficiency: “Economic efficiency asks that we choose the set of entitlements which would lead to that
allocation of resources which could not be improved in the sense that a further change would not so improve the
condition of those who gained by it that they could compensate those who lost from it and still be better off than
before.” See id. at 1093–94.
83.
Id. at 1093.
84.
Id.
85.
Calabresi, supra note 3, at 529.
86.
Guido Calabresi, A Broader View of the Cathedral: The Significance of the Liability Rule, Correcting a
Misapprehension, 7 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 12 (2014).
87.
It is noted that Calabresi also discusses workers’ compensation from an economic perspective of the
“allocation of resources” and “loss-distribution” theories. For this discussion, see Calabresi, supra note 75, at 500,
517.
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against their employers, except within the statutory exceptions, because societal
transaction costs have determined that a liability rule applies.
Therefore, the statutorily mandated workers’ compensation damages provide the
appropriate remedy for common work-related injuries under liability rule
protections. Arguably, this analysis also explains why state legislatures choose to
carve out an intentional tort exception to the workers’ compensation statutes. By
doing so, states have determined that an employee may maintain his right to his
bodily integrity in refusing to consent to willful or intentional injury. However, due
to the transaction costs implicated in the employment context, to meet the intentional
tort exception, legislatures demand that the employee meet a higher evidentiary
standard to demonstrate that he or she meets the strict test.88
Thus, the intentional tort exception provides heightened liability rule protections
to a portion of work-related injuries for public policy reasons, and once this
protection is implicated, it becomes an election of remedies issue.89 This means that
the employee must choose to either accept the statutory workers’ compensation as
his exclusive remedy, or waive such coverage and choose to sue in tort.90
Accordingly, an employee’s “complaint that he would have demanded more will not
avail him once the objectively determined value is set.”91 And ideally, the workers’
compensation system based on this model “internalize[s] expected costs to all
potential injurers and potential victims in a way that would minimize the cost of
accidents.”92
B. Rights Essentialism, Remedial Equilibration, and Remedial
Deterrence
Calabresi and Melamed’s model, distinguishing property and liability type
protections for certain rights, implicates an additional concept called the rights
essentialism theory.93 The rights essentialism theory initially identifies the right and
then identifies the appropriate judicial application of the right.94 Viewed separately
from the remedy, the right “is then corrupted by being forced into a remedial
apparatus that translates the right into an operational rule applied to the facts of the
real world.”95 However, under an approach discussed by Daryl Levinson, rights
essentialism is not the most accurate model, and Levinson provides a new theory
________________________
88.
See, e.g., R.L. Haines Constr., LLC v. Santamaria, 161 So. 3d 528, 534 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) review
denied, 171 So. 3d 120 (Fla. 2015).
89.
MCGINLEY, supra note 30.
90.
Id.
91.
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 75, at 1092.
92.
Steven G. Medema, Debating Law’s Irrelevance: Legal Scholarship and the Coase Theorem in the
1960s, 2 TEX. A&M L. REV. 159, 178 (2014).
93.
Levinson, supra note 76, at 858 (discussing that like constitutional law, contract law also implicates the
idea that rights and remedies are “functionally inseparable,” interdependent, and “inextricably intertwined,” as
recognized by Calabresi and Melamed).
94.
Id. It is noted that Levinson’s approach to defining the scope of remedies takes the form of a constitutional
law analysis; however, Levinson’s article also usefully compares and contrasts constitutional law with the private
law of contract and tort, with comparisons to Calabresi and Melamed’s theory of property and liability rules, useful
for comparison in the workers’ compensation context. Id.
95.
Id.
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with a more applicable approach to remedies law called “remedial equilibration.”96
Under the remedial equilibration model: “[r]ights are dependent on remedies not just
for their application to the real world, but for their scope, shape, and very
existence.”97 Indeed, as applied to Calabresi and Melamed’s approach,
a ‘right’ . . . enforced by a liability rule means something different
than one enforced by a property rule, and that deciding who has a
right (or, in Cathedral terms, an “entitlement”) is often less
important than deciding how that right should be protected in order
to best facilitate efficient transfers.98
In the workers’ compensation context, application of the remedial equilibration
model demonstrates that the right interrelates with the remedy, that is, the right to
workers’ compensation relief under a negligence theory necessarily ties the liability
rule protection for the right into a remedial equilibration model. Rights essentialists
would view the right as separate from the remedy: that the employee has a job, and
if the employer intentionally injures him, then the employee would have a remedy
of suing his employer in tort. However, remedial equilibration demonstrates that it
is meaningless to talk about a distinction between rights and remedies: an employee
has a right to sue in tort if his employer intentionally injures him. Nonetheless, the
employee’s right to sue his employer in tort for intentional wrongdoings is
meaningless if the remedy is inaccessible.99 Certainly, if a right never results in a
remedy, the right is irrelevant.
Accordingly, an additional theory applicable to analyze the narrowness of the
intentional tort exception is remedial deterrence.100 This doctrine assumes that
raising the “price” of violating a right by giving greater remedial protection would
result in fewer violations of the right.101 Therefore, Levinson posits that the way for
courts to lessen the number of rights’ violations is to diminish the right in the first
place.102 A corollary is that courts can also lower the “price” of the violations by
limiting the remedies available.103 And, although the application of remedial
deterrence may be difficult to apply based on fact-specific factors,104 the “general
________________________
96.
See id. Levinson explains that: “The rights-essentialist picture, in which courts begin with the pure,
Platonic ideal of a constitutional right and only then pragmatically apply the right through the vehicles of
implementation and remediation, bears little resemblance to the actual judicial practice of rights-construction.” Id.
at 873.
97.
Levinson, supra note 76, at 858.
98.
Id. at 859.
99.
As a logical extension of the dissent in R.L. Haines, the exception for intentionality should not be
impossible to overcome—that is why there is an existence of an intentional-tort exception to the workers’
compensation scheme. See R.L. Haines Constr., LLC v. Santamaria, 161 So. 3d 528, 534 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)
(Cohen, J., dissenting).
100.
For a detailed discussion on remedial deterrence in the constitutional context, see Levinson, supra note
76, at 889–900.
101.
Id. at 889.
102.
Id.
103.
Id.
104.
See id. at 890 (“Individual examples of remedial deterrence are difficult to document with great
confidence because claiming that a right would be different if a different remedy followed entails a counterfactual

https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol21/iss2/4

12

: Workers' Compensation Law & the Remedial Waiver

Spring 2016

Workers' Compensation Law & the Remedial Waiver

229

point [is] that remedial consequences exert an important influence over the shape
and existence” of rights.105 Therefore, courts will construe rights in a way to avoid
undesirable remedial consequences.106
As applied to the right to recovery under the intentional wrongdoing exception
to most state workers’ compensation schemes, the remedial deterrence model
provides one avenue of explanation for why courts construe the applicable statutes
narrowly. It provides a model that demonstrates that courts are likely to define the
right restrictively, given the unpredictability of the outcomes for allowing such
claims to proceed. This not only helps persuade the employee to choose to elect
workers’ compensation as his or her remedy,107 but also limits the right in a way that
promotes the policy behind implementing workers’ compensation regimes in the first
place.108 Thus, this model effectively describes why and how courts have limited and
narrowly construed an employee’s right to sue under the intentional tort exception
to workers’ compensation systems.
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Once it is determined what type of remedial protection applies, one can begin to
analyze how courts analyze issues that arise in the workers’ compensation arena. Of
previous constitutional concern was the Due Process Clause, but the Supreme Court
of the United States has resolved this issue in favor of the constitutionality of
workers’ compensation schemes.109 The argument was that workers’ compensation
statutes were unconstitutional because these regimes abrogate both an individual’s
right to file a lawsuit in tort and the right to a jury trial.110 In 1917, the Supreme Court
upheld New York’s Workman’s Compensation Law, finding that the legislature
could alter such common law rights in compliance with the Fourteenth Amendment
if the legislature provides a “reasonably just substitute.”111 The Court clarified that
“[t]his, of course, is not to say that any scale of compensation, however insignificant,
on the one hand, or onerous, on the other, would be supportable.”112

________________________
claim that is ordinarily highly speculative: that the right would have been A rather than B if the remedy had been X
rather than Y.”).
105.
Id.
106.
Levinson, supra note 76, at 885.
107.
Once an employee elects his remedy by suing the employer in tort for an intentional wrongdoing, the
employee has waived his right to collect under the workers’ compensation scheme. See MCGINLEY, supra note 30
(citing Chiang v. Wildcat Groves, Inc., 703 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)).
108.
See Burnett, supra note 23, at 491 (discussing the policy reasons for implementing workers’
compensation statutes in the United States).
109.
N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 208 (1917).
110.
See Deborah G. Kohl, Tackling the Elephant in the Room: Exclusive Remedy, LEXISNEXIS LEGAL
NEWSROOM:
WORKERS
COMPENSATION
L.
(Mar.
11,
2015,
10:41
PM),
http://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/workers-compensation/b/recent-cases-news-trends-developments/
archive/2015/03/11/tackling-the-elephant-in-the-room-exclusive-remedy.aspx#sthash.LlX4CJVN.dpuf.
111.
White, 243 U.S. at 201.
112.
Id. at 205.
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A. General Policy Concerns and the Intentional Tort Exception
Today, two main concerns arise within the workers’ compensation field—the
amount of compensation given to the injured employee under the exclusive remedial
provision113 and the scope of the intentional tort exception.114 The undercompensation concern begs the question: “[W]hen do statutory changes result in
such a manifest violation of the social bargain that the only answer is to void the
exclusive remedy doctrine and reinstate the tort remedy?”115 The full answer to this
question is beyond the scope of this paper; however, it should be noted that over the
previous thirteen years, thirty-three state legislatures “have cut benefits, made it
more difficult to qualify for benefits or given employers more control over medical
treatment.”116 Yet, the employer’s intentional wrong raises the most concern because
“[u]nlike ordinary negligence, intentional harms introduce an element of moral
hazard that is very difficult to control by a set of rules designed for accidents.”117
Recently in Florida, the constitutionality of the exclusivity of the remedy under
the workers’ compensation statute has been attacked, albeit unsuccessfully.118 This
provision has also been challenged in various other states.119 However, as the
exclusive remedy is ostensibly the most appropriate approach to ensure efficient
compensation for injured employees while promoting an effective market by
providing clarity for the employer, it is likely that with its long history and its current
application, this remedy will remain exclusive for employees injured by an
________________________
113.
See Kohl, supra note 110. “When is the replacement for the tort system a reasonable alternative?” Id.
“[A]t what dollar level do you draw the line below which a system is providing an unconstitutional level of benefits
and reversion to tort law is the only remedy?” Id. “At what level has the legislature gone so far as to impinge on the
social bargain and tread on due process?” Id.; see also Shapiro, supra note 74, at 28 (“In most states, there is an
inverse relationship between the seriousness of an injury and the amount of compensation. The compensation for
fatalities is often less than the amount paid for temporary and permanent disabilities. Statutorily prescribed formulas
limit compensation for temporary disabilities to less than the direct wage losses of better paid employees. Worse,
compensation for permanent partial disability payments often does not equal the total wage loss of any employee.
Finally, there is no compensation for the loss of fringe benefits or nonpecuniary losses to workers and their
families.”).
114.
See Gorton, supra note 25, at 811.
115.
Id.
116.
Howard Berkes, Opt-Out Plans Let Companies Work Without Workers’ Comp, NPR (Oct. 15, 2015, 7:07
AM),
http://www.npr.org/2015/10/14/448544926/texas-oklahoma-permit-companies-to-dump-workercompensation-plans.
117.
Epstein, supra note 25, at 814. Epstein argues that employer’s intentional torts possibly should not be
directed into the tort system as if the workers’ compensation laws did not exist. Id. He rejects this approach as
inferior, arguing for an alternative of additional fines assessed to the employer through existing workers’
compensation statutes for intentional wrongs to employees. See id. (“The advantages of this approach are two. First,
it keeps the entire case within the workers’ compensation system, so that there is no need to worry about the
coordination of tort and compensation actions. Second, it protects the system against the indirect erosion that occurs
when the intent requirement is attenuated to include mental states that are insufficient to support either criminal
punishment or . . . punitive damages.”).
118.
See Florida v. Fla. Workers’ Advocates, 167 So. 3d 500, 501 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015). Due to procedural
issues, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s holding that section 440.11 of the Florida Statutes (i.e., the
“exclusiveness of liability” provision) was facially unconstitutional under both the United States and Florida
Constitutions. Id. The appellate court therefore never reached the merits of the claim. See id. at 506.
119.
See, e.g., McKinnon v. W. Sugar Coop. Corp., 225 P.3d 1221, 1222 (Mont. 2010); Mo. Alliance for
Retired Ams. v. Dep’t of Labor Indus. Relations, 277 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Mo. 2009).
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employer’s negligence. But, the exception to this exclusivity—the right to sue for an
intentional tort—is more controversial.
As discussed above in Section II, the Florida statutory scheme outlining this
exception and the subsequent Florida case law demonstrate the harsh results in the
application of the intentional wrongdoing exception.120 Indeed, workers’
compensation schemes that provide an exception for intentional wrongs by
employers who act with “deliberate intent” or “virtual certainty” that their conduct
will result in injury or death have “been twisted by courts and legislatures so that
workers can almost never access the civil legal system when they have been hurt at
work, even if their employer has acted egregiously.”121 Employers are able to
capitalize on this and choose to save money rather than provide a safe workplace
because of the low risks of an employee having a successful civil claim.122 Because
the current approach to the intentional wrongdoing exception to workers’
compensation schemes essentially eviscerates any remedy for the employee, these
systems should be revisited.
B. Employer Opt-Out Programs
Another concerning mechanism crafted by two individual states to date are
employee opt-out programs. In Texas, for example, employers are not required to
participate in the state’s workers’ compensation program; they are free to “opt out”
of it.123 Texas refers to those employers that choose to opt out of workers’
compensation as “non-subscribers.”124 The Texas Department of Insurance explains
that such nonsubscribers are not immune from lawsuits by employees and thus could
be subject to high damage awards if sued by an employee for negligence.125 On the
contrary, if an employer participates in the workers’ compensation program, Texas
law limits the employer’s liability and sets a statutory cap on damages, dictating that
such compensation is the exclusive remedy for the employee.126
However, despite the ostensible risk Texas employers seem to be taking by
opting out of the workers’ compensation scheme, it actually proves to be more cost
effective for these employers. These plans “almost universally have lower benefits,
more restrictions and virtually no independent oversight.”127 Under these schemes,
________________________
120.
See supra Part II.A–B for a discussion of the Florida workers’ compensation statute and subsequent case:
R.L. Haines Constr., LLC v. Santamaria, 161 So. 3d 528 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) review denied, 171 So. 3d 120
(Fla. 2015).
121.
Gorton, supra note 25, at 811.
122.
Id.
123.
See Workers’ Compensation Insurance, TEX. DEP’T INS., http://www.tdi.texas.gov/consumer/wc.html
(last visited Mar. 2, 2016).
124.
See Information for Workers’ Compensation Non-subscribers, TEX. DEP’T INS.,
http://www.tdi.texas.gov/wc/ employer/cb007.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2016).
125.
Id.
126.
Id.
127.
Michael Grabell & Howard Berkes, Inside Corporate America’s Campaign to Ditch Workers’ Comp,
PROPUBLICA (Oct. 14, 2015), https://www.propublica.org/article/inside-corporate-americas-plan-to-ditch-workerscomp (explaining that these opt-out programs are “why McDonald’s doesn’t cover carpal tunnel syndrome and why
Brookdale Senior Living, the nation’s largest chadin of assisted living facilities, doesn’t cover most bacterial
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employers are not required to submit any documentation to the state about the
coverage provided because Texas does not regulate opt-out programs.128 Indeed,
employers have been fighting bills for several years that would require them to share
this data.129
Oklahoma similarly enacted an opt-out-of-workers’-compensation statute last
year.130 Tennessee and South Carolina are also considering implementing such
plans.131 Moreover, several leading company executives are campaigning to have
laws passed “in as many as a dozen states” within the next ten years.132 These plans
“give employers almost complete control over the medical and legal process after
workers get injured,” including choosing doctors, settling claims, and forcing the
employees to accept the settlement at the employer’s whim.133 To be sure, the
employees can appeal the employer’s decision, but most often, the employee has
agreed to a binding decision by a committee set up by the employer.134 Even without
such committees, most often the employee has consented to the employer’s program
as his sole remedy when he began employment.135
C.

Recommendation

Both the exclusive remedy provision, with its exception for intentional
wrongdoings, and the opt-out systems in place in Texas and Oklahoma implicate a
further issue within the remedial context, the concept of remedial substantiation. This
theory holds that “the cash value of a right is often nothing more than what the courts
will do if the right is violated”—the remedies that are available determine the
right.136 Therefore, if a person has no remedy, discussion of the violation of a right
is meaningless because the perceived right is no right at all without a remedy.137
Thus, both issues “bring into question the basic fundamental social bargain that made
workers’ compensation systems possible in the first place.”138
Accordingly, at least this author posits that because a right means nothing
without a remedy—indeed under the principles of remedial equilibration and
particularly within the theory of remedial substantiation—that reform is necessary
in the area of workers’ compensation. Specifically, the intentional tort exception
needs to be revised so the remedy is not illusory. Reform could be accomplished, in
Florida for example, by revisiting the Florida Legislature’s 2003 amendment to the
workers’ compensation statute and reinstating the broader test fashioned by the state
________________________
infections. Why Taco Bell can accompany injured workers to doctors’ appointments and Sears can deny benefits if
workers don’t report injuries by the end of their shifts”).
128.
Id.
129.
Id.
130.
Berkes, supra note 116.
131.
Grabell & Berkes, supra note 127.
132.
Id.
133.
Id.
134.
Id.
135.
Id.
136.
Levinson, supra note 76, at 887–88.
137.
See id. at 888.
138.
See Kohl, supra note 110.

https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol21/iss2/4

16

: Workers' Compensation Law & the Remedial Waiver

Spring 2016

Workers' Compensation Law & the Remedial Waiver

233

supreme court. The test for whether an employee may maintain a cause of action
against an employer for intentional misconduct should comport with common law
principles of intent. Therefore, the test should be whether the employer’s conduct
was substantially certain to result in injury or death for the employee. Tests that align
more closely with common law principles have been successfully implemented in
several states,139 and there is also a wide body of common law for courts to follow
to implement this standard.
The “substantial certainty” test is the more appropriate standard, as demonstrated
by the states’ compensation systems that currently provide that this is the appropriate
test.140 Indeed, “[d]espite critics’ warnings about the floodgates opening up and the
workers’ compensation system losing all meaning, the expansion has been very
limited.”141 In only a few instances, “containing the most egregious employer
actions,” have employees been able to recover under this “expanded” standard.142
Moreover, cases decided in Florida subsequent to the state supreme court’s holding,
but prior to the legislature’s 2003 amendment, demonstrate that the “substantial
certainty” standard is more workable.143
Applying a “substantial certainty” test will facilitate a system that does not strip
employees of their right to sue for an intentional wrongdoing by removing the
remedy, as the current system does. Employees should have access to the legal
system when an employer acts egregiously, and the scope of the remedy should not
be limited to the subjective standard of an employer’s knowledge that its conduct is
“virtually certain” to result in injury or death. Moreover, the statutory opt-out
schemes often dwindle any liability-type protections into nothing, and therefore
these systems should be revisited to ensure that employees are not left without a
remedy for workplace-related injuries.
CONCLUSION
The exclusive remedy doctrine is a “fundamental building block of the workers’
compensation system.”144 Indeed, an effective and predictable exclusive remedy
________________________
139.
Gorton, supra note 25, at 841 (citing Ohio, Michigan, West Virginia, Louisiana, and North Carolina as
examples).
140.
Id.
141.
Id. (citing Melissa F. Ross, Comment, Ripples in Treacherous Waters: A Consideration of the Effects of
North Carolina’s Intentional Tort Exception to Workers’ Compensation, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 513 (1996)
(documenting North Carolina’s experience)).
142.
Id. (citing Ross, supra note 141, at 554).
143.
Under this standard, Florida courts focused on the specific facts of each case and found that sometimes
recovery was appropriate, while in other circumstances recovery was not available for the employee under the
intentional tort exception, but applying the substantial certainty test. See, e.g., EAC USA, Inc. v. Kawa, 805 So. 2d
1, 5 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (finding that the employer’s actions were substantially certain to result in injury to
the employee, applying the Turner objective substantial certainty test). But see Garrick v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc.,
798 So. 2d 875, 879 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (applying the objective standard set forth in Turner, the Fourth District
Court of Appeals held that the complaint did not contain allegations of ultimate facts that would support a jury’s
verdict that the employer’s conduct was substantially certain to result in injury to the employee); Pacheco v. Power
& Light Co., 784 So. 2d 1159, 1163 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (denying recovery and noting that “that the cases
which have actually applied the Turner doctrine, especially Turner itself, have characteristically involved a degree
of deliberate or willful indifference to employee safety which simply [did] not exist in [that] case”).
144.
Kohl, supra note 110.
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doctrine that limits employer liability for employee injuries is necessary for a viable
workers’ compensation system.145 This remains true even though an employee loses
his or her right to sue in tort or to have a jury trial.146 However, if an employee’s
right to sue in tort for intentional wrongdoings by the employer never results in
recovery, the liability rule protections afforded to such employee are rendered
meaningless.
A different system is not the answer; workers’ compensation statutes as an
exclusive remedy for common workplace injuries facilitate outcomes that are more
efficient for employees and provide a level of certainty to employers.147 Indeed,
turning to an alternative system “is not one which any of the participants . . . from
employee to employer to insurer to legislature should lightly enter into without
forethought and consideration of all of the potential consequences.”148 Yet, the
exclusive remedy provision should not encompass intentional wrongdoings by an
employer that the employer knows or is “substantially certain” will result in injury
or death to its employee. Because a right without a remedy is not a right at all,149 as
Florida case law demonstrates, the exception to the system for intentional
wrongdoings should be revisited.

________________________
145.
King, supra note 7, at 416.
146.
See N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 195–96 (1917).
147.
See King, supra note 7, at 416.
148.
Kohl, supra note 110.
149.
Indeed, under the principles of remedial substantiation, if the cash value of a right is zero, the right really
does not exist at all. See Levinson, supra note 76. Moreover, under the principles of remedial deterrence, if the
legislature provides the more appropriate exception to the exclusive remedy doctrine of “substantial certainty” rather
than “virtual certainty,” courts will be less likely to construe an employee’s right so narrowly that it does not allow
for recovery, and rather it will result in the remedy being accessible for intentional wrongdoings by the employer.
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